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The Minerals Sector o f Botswana
Introduction
Histoiy
The original occupants of what is today Botswana are the ancestors of the San (“bushmen”) hunter- 
gatherers who are now restricted to the more inhospitable parts of the Kalahari Desert. About fifteen 
hundred years ago the first Bantu-speaking cultures arrived in the area bringing with them iron making 
technology which was practised over much of Botswana using laterites or haematite as ore. Ancient iron 
ore mining sites have been discovered at Tautswemogala and Gakgale in the south of the country1.
With the rise of the Zulu nation in the 1820’s, the subsequent generalised warfare (Difaqane) was felt 
as far west as Botswana as refugees moved west and offshoots from the Zulu nation (Mzilikazi) raided 
the area. In 1872 Khama the Great became Chief of the Ngwato and proved to be exceptionally astute 
in balancing the military might of the AmaNdebele (in south-western Zimbabwe) with European 
missionary interests. It has been noted that missionary penetration was greatest in areas ‘‘whose rulers 
were subject to ... outside pressure and who therefore saw in the missionaries potentially valuable 
political allies”2 who could also aid in keeping the land-hungry settlers (Boers) at bay.
With the creation of the Boer Republics in the mid-19th Century, Bechuanaland, as Botswana was then 
known, became the main route north and the narrow strip between the Kalahari desert and the 
Transvaal Republic contained what was known as the “missionary road” to Zimbabwe, Zambia and 
central Africa.
In 1885 the area north of the Molopo river to 22°S became a British Protectorate called Bechuanaland. 
In 1888 Cecil John Rhodes, the Cape diamond mining magnate, managed to get the British government 
to declare the area north of 22°S as far as the Zambezi River, a sphere of British interest for which, in 
1889, control was delegated by Royal Charter to his British South Africa Company (BSAC)3.
In 1895 Khama the Great managed to thwart Rhodes’ attempt to have Bechuanaland transferred to the 
BSAC and, together with the other two protectorates (Basutoland and Swaziland), managed to avoid 
inclusion in the racist Union of South Africa at its formation in 1910. However the Union Act provided 
for the possible future inclusion of the protectorates with the consent of their peoples and provided for 
a common customs union with South Africa, which continues to this day.
In 1950 a Joint Advisory Committee, that had both black and white members, was established and in 
1965 the country attained internal self-government and the administration was moved from Mafekeng 
in South Africa to Gaborone. Independence was achieved the next year under the Botswana Democratic 
Party led by the late Sir Seretse Khama.
Since independence Botswana has attempted to steer an independent course in the face of its powerful 
neighbour, the Republic of South Africa. Throughout the last two decades it has tried to remain open 
to refugees from South Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola and Namibia, but has not given 
“sanctuary” to ANC fighters. Botswana left the South African Rand monetary area in 1977 and set up 
its own currency, the Pula (rain).
Despite South African threats, it decided to join the other independent states of the region (Mozam­
bique, Zambia, Angola and Tanzania) in the Front Line States (FLS) in the struggle for the liberation
of Zimbabwe and the late Sir Seretse Khama was one of the main movers in the formation of the SADCC 
in 1980. A clear signal on its independent stance was sent to Pretoria when it agreed to house the SADCC 
Secretariat in Gaborone in 1981 and rejected the South African sponsored CONSAS regional grouping 
and has also rejected several attempts to sign a “Nkomati” type security accord.
The Economy
At independence in 1966 Botswana was a poverty stricken state with an economy based on cattle and 
migrant miners remittances from South Africa. Britain even had to subsidise the recurrent budget 
through aid. This situation started to change with the discovery of the Orapa kimberlite pipe in 1967 
followed by the decision to assess the Selebi-Phikwe copper-nickel deposit in 1968. Diamond produc­
tion started at Orapa in 1971 and the first copper-nickel matte was produced at Selebi-Phikwe in 1974. 
Further diamond discoveries were made and production started at Letlhakane in 1977 and Jwaneng in 
1982.
Fired by mineral production, the economy grew rapidly throughout the 1970’s. From 1965 to 1980 the 
GDP grew by 14.2% per annum in real terms4 and by 1980 the GDP was almost one billion US dollars 
and the GDP per capita about one thousand US dollars. From 1980 to 1987 annual GDP growth was 
13%, the highest in the world5 and by 1988 the GDP had reached 3.27 GPula (about 1.8 GUSD). But 
this has led to an economy “in some ways like an oil state, with an enclave producing substantial wealth 
that has had relatively little direct impact on the majority of the population”6, though the provision of 
welfare, education and infrastructure has improved dramatically with increasing mineral revenues.
Botswana has a small population (about 1.3m) and the second lowest population density (2/km2) in the 
region after Namibia (1.5/km2). The country has experienced relatively high inflation in the 1980’s, 
about 130% to 1988, mainly due to imported inflation from the country’s main trading partner, South 
Africa, rather than because of domestic policies. Similarly the Pula has been devalued from 1.35 US 
dollars to the Pula in 1980, to 1.83 Pula to the US dollar in 1988, in line with the devaluation of the South 
African Rand, but this is well above the Rand which was 2.26 to the USD in 1988.
f  \
Table 1. BOTSWANA, BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS (Pula)
U n i t  1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
P o pulation M .88 .9 4 .9 8 1 .0 1 1 .0 5 1 .0 9 1 .1 3 1 .1 7 1 .2 1
Pop . d e n s i t y /km2 1 .5 1 .6 1 .6 1 .7 1 .7 1 . 8 1 .9 1 .9 2 . 0
F o r e x  Rate /USD .74 .8 8 1 .0 6 1 .1 0 1 .3 0 1 .9 0 1 .8 6 1 .6 6 1 .8 3
C P I 1 100 119 134 146 155 170 189 207 229
GDP m p 2 G .7 0 .7 8 1 .0 3 1 .2 8 1 .5 2 2 .1 4 2 .4 5 2 .6 1 3 .2 7
GDP/cap U S D 1074 942 995 1150 1116 1037 1170 1344 1472
Exports fob M 391 331 467 697 857 1383 1615 2645 2710
Imports cif M 538 664 704 806 895 1095 1332 1572 2010
Trade Balance M -146 -333 -2 3 6 -1 0 9 - 3 8 289 283 1072 700
G F C F 3 G 307 305 320 338 484 412 484
GFCF / G D P % 44% 39% 31% 26% 32% 19% 19%
Debt G U S D .1 5 .16 .2 1 .18 .1 8 .3 3 .3 9 .5 1
D e b t / G D P % 16% 18% 22% 16% 15% 30% 29% 33%
L a b o u r  Force k 83 97 100 101 110 117 130 150 169
Go v t  R e v e n u e * G 271 283 370 511 755 1085 1461 1758 2131
Area: 600,000 km2, Currency: Pula, ‘ financial year to March 31
^consumer price index, 2gross domestic product at market prices, 3gross fixed capital
formation. - Sources: CSO 1989.
Economic dependence on South Africa and South African capital is high due to Botswana’s location, 
surrounded on three sides by South Africa and, until 1990, its dependency Namibia, due to its 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), due to its limited size (population) and 
due to the ownership by South African capital of most of the economy, particularly the mining company, 
Anglo American/De Beers.
SACU earnings as a proportion of total export earnings have been steadily falling as mineral exports 
have increased, from 38% in 1980 to 14% in 1988(average25%),ashas the percentage of trade (imports 
and exports) with South Africa, from 53% in 1980 to 32% in 1987. Between 1980 and 1987 the average 
proportion of imports from the RSA was 82% and exports to the RSA 9%.
C Table 2. BOTSWANA: DEPENDENCE ON THE RSA
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Avg3
E x p o rts  fo b M 391 331 467 697 857 1383 1615 2645 2710
SADCC M 33 35 61 64 34 54 97 128
RSA M 26 58 56 59 76 78 91 111
% RSA 7% 17% 12% 8% 9% 6% 6% 4% 9%
Im ports c i f M 538 664 704 806 895 1095 1332 1572 2010
SADCC M 36 42 45 59 78 81 101 121
RSA M 467 581 609 670 698 814 1022 1251
% RSA 87% 88% 87% 83% 78% 74% 77% 80% 82%
% Trade w i t h RSA 53% 64% 57% 48% 44% 36% 38% 32%
Govt R even u e1 G 271 283 370 5 11 755 1085 1461 1758 2131
SACU r e c e i p t s 102 104 114 156 155 149 192 234 291
% SACU r e c e i p t 38% 37% 31% 31% 21% 14% 13% 13% 14% 25%
Labour F o rce k 83 97 100 101 110 117 130 150 169
M iners RSA2 k 21 20 19 19 19 20 21 20 19
% Labour f o r c e 26% 21% 18% 19% 17% 17% 16% 13% 11% 18%
R e m it ta n c e s 45 50 50 52 55 49 48 52 64
% E x p o r ts 4 11% 15% 11% 7% 6% 4% 3% 2% 2% 7%
1financial year March 31, Migrants in RSA, 3average for years with data, Remittances as a 
% of exports. Sources: CSO Bot 1989, Dept of Mines 1989.
In a crisis-ridden Africa Botswana today appears as one of the few buoyant economies. Based on huge 
mineral resources, this expansion has created a situation where Botswana exhibits a very favourable 
balance of payments situation. Foreign reserves stood at 3.0 billion US dollars in 1989. This situation, 
by no means unique to Botswana (other low population mineral rich countries such as Gabon, Papua 
New Guinea and small oil countries, are similar), raises the question...
“...to what extent Botswana’s experience can be characterized as a development 
process containing the seeds of structural change, or is just another case of growth 
without development.”7
The Mining Sector
General
Until the 1970’s agriculture and cattle were the mainstay of the Botswana economy. Today mining is by 
far the most important economic activity in terms of value, accounting for 40% to 50% of GDP (average 
36% for 1980-88) and up to 90% of exports (average 80% for 1980-88) but only 6% of formal 
employment (average 8% for 1980-88) as the industry tends to be extremely capital intensive.
In 1989 the Botswana mining industry produced 1515 MUSD of minerals but only employed 10,599 
workers while, on the other hand, mineral production in neighbouring Zimbabwe was only 456 MUSD 
but the less capital intensive industry there employed five times as many people (54,500workers)8. The 
value of mineral output per miner is the highest in the SADCC region at 114,000 USD/miner in 1988.
S  ~ ---------------------
'  Table 3. BOTSWANA, BASIC MINERAL SECTOR DATA (Pula)
1980 L981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Avg1
GDP M ining M 204 130 286 405 553 1005 1211 1175 1435
% GDP M in ing  % 29% 17% 28% 32% 36% 47% 49% 45% 44% 36%
Min. P r o d .2 M 304 288 478 618 961 1031 1245 1360 2155
M in .E x p o rts  M 319 225 325 538 684 L169 1323 2371 2350
% M in .E x p o r ts 3 81% 68% 70% 77% 80% 85% 82% 90% 87% 80%
Min. l a b o u r 4 k 8 .1 8 .5 8 . 8 9 . 0 9 . 2 9 . 4 9 . 5 9 , 6 1 0 .3
E x p a t . la b o u r 5 .71 .72 .7 1 .7 0 .6 6 .66 .6 2 .6 5 .6 8
% E x p a t .  8.8% 8.5% 8.1% 7.8% 7.2% 7.0% 6.6% 6.7% 6.6% 7%
% mng l a b o u r 6 9.7% 8.8% 8.8% 8.9% 8.4% 8.0% 7.3% 6.4% 6.1% 8%
M .P r o d / la b 7kUSD 51 38 51 63 80 58 71 85 114 68
avg w a g e /a n 8k 2 .2 3  2 .6 7  2 .9 9 1.69 3 .78  4 .21 5 .5 8 5 . 8 5 6 . 2 8
avg REAL wage 2 .2 3  2 .2 4 2 .2 3 2 .5 3 2 .4 4  ;>.47 2 .9 5 2 . 8 3 2 .7 4 2 .5 2
Mng Revenue M 101 77 99 194 376 581 845 1034 1327
% Mng R evenue9 37% 27% 27% 38% 50% 54% 58% 59% 62% 46%
Average 1980-88, M ineral production, ^mineral exports as a % of total exports, 4mining 
sector labour, 5expatriate labour, ^ mining labour as a % of total formal employment, 
^mineral production per labourer in kUSD, 8average annual wage, 9mineral revenue as a % 
of total govt, revenue. Sources: CSO 1989, Dept of Mines 1989. 
v ^
Since 1981 mining has replaced the SACU as the principal source of government revenue and by 1988 
the industry contributed 62% of government receipts through taxes and royalties (average 46% for 
1980-88). Expatriate labour in mining, as a proportion of the total mining labour force, dropped steadily 
until 1984 when it levelled off at about 7%. By far the majority are white South African employees of 
Anglo American and De Beers.
The mining sector’s contribution to formal employment is small and has fallen from 10% in 1980 to 6% 
in 1988 (average 8%) due to the capital intensive nature of open-cast kimberlite pipe mining. In 1988 
migrants on the South African mines were double the workforce on the national mines. In general 
miners’ salaries have kept ahead of inflation and in 1988 average mining sector wages were 23% higher 
than 1980 in real terms. In 1988 mining wages were 70% higher than the national average for the formal 
sector and six times those for the agricultural sector9. This has resulted in a relatively “tame” mine 
workers union with almost no industrial disputes.
The start of diamond mining in 1971 initiated a new era in Botswana’s economic development. A 
significant switch occurred between agriculture, whose share of overall GDP contracted, and mining, 
whose contribution to GDP rose spectacularly. Similar dramatic changes were not found in any other 
sector, although trade recorded a modest growth in its share o f GDP. Manufacturing and general 
government erven declined somewhat.
M ining s contribution to capital formation is not, on the other hand, particularly significant apart from  
a few  years in the early 1980’s. Quite common for this kind o f raw material based economy is the
im portant role o f the governm ent sector for maintaining the investment level. The 1970’s and80’s was 
a period when Botswana’s dependence on mining deepened considerably. This pattern is clearly visible
In 1989 the Botswana mining industry produced 1515 MUSD of minerals but only employed 10,599 
workers while, on the other hand, mineral production in neighbouring Zimbabwe was only 456 MUSD 
but the less capital intensive industry there employed five times as many people (54,500workers)8. The 
value of mineral output per miner is the highest in the SADCC region at 114,000 USD/miner in 1988.
Table 3. BOTSWANA, BASIC MINERAL SECTOR DATA (Pula)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Avg1
GDP M ining M 204 130 286 405 553 1005 1211 1175 1435
% GDP M ining % 29% 17% 28% 32% 36% 47% 49% 45% 44% 36%
Min. P r o d .2 M 304 288 478 618 961 1031 1245 1360 21 5 5
M in .E x p o rts  M 319 225 325 538 684 1169 1323 2371 2350
% M in .E x p o r ts 3 81% 68% 70% 77% 80% 85% 82% 90% 87% 80%
Min. l a b o u r 4 k 8 .1 8 .5 8 . 8 9 . 0 9 . 2 9 . 4 9 . 5 9 . 6  1 0 .3
E x p a t . l a b o u r 5 .71 .72 .7 1 .7 0 .6 6 .66 .6 2 .6 5  .6 8
% E x p a t .  8.8% 8.5% 8.1% 7.8% 7.2% 7.0% 6.6% 6.7% 6.6% 7%
% mng l a b o u r 6 9.7% 8.8% 8.8% 8.9% 8.4% 8.0% 7.3% 6.4% 6.1% 8%
M .P r o d / la b 7kUSD 51 38 51 63 80 58 71 85 114 68
avg w a g e /a n 8k 2 .2 3  2 .67  2 .99  3 .6 9  31.78 4 .2 1 5 .5 8 5 .8 5  6 .2 8
avg REAL wage 2 .2 3  2' .2 4  2 .2 3  2' .5 3  2 .4 4 2 .4 7 2 .9 5 2 . 8 3  2 . 7 4 2 .5 2
Mng Revenue M 101 77 99 194 376 581 845 1034 1327
% Mng R evenue9 37% 27% 27% 38% 50% 54% 58% 59% 62% 46%
Average 1980-88,2mfneral production, -^mineral exports as a % of total exports, 4mining 
sector labour, 5expatriate labour, ^mining labour as a % of total formal employment, 
7mineral production per labourer in kUSD, 8average annual wage, 9mineral revenue as a % 
of total govt, revenue. Sources: CSO1989, Dept of Mines 1989.
Since 1981 mining has replaced the SACU as the principal source of government revenue and by 1988 
the industry contributed 62% of government receipts through taxes and royalties (average 46% for 
1980-88). Expatriate labour in mining, as a proportion of the total mining labour force, dropped steadily 
until 1984 when it levelled off at about 7%. By far the majority are white South African employees of 
Anglo American and De Beers.
The mining sector’s contribution to formal employment is small and has fallen from 10% in 1980 to 6% 
in 1988 (average 8%) due to the capital intensive nature of open-cast kimberlite pipe mining. In 1988 
migrants on the South African mines were double the workforce on the national mines. In general 
miners’ salaries have kept ahead of inflation and in 1988 average mining sector wages were 23% higher 
than 1980in real terms. In 1988 mining wages were 70% higher than the national average for the formal 
sector and six times those for the agricultural sector9. This has resulted in a relatively “tame” mine 
workers union with almost no industrial disputes.
The start of diamond mining in 1971 initiated a new era in Botswana’s economic development. A 
significant switch occurred between agriculture, whose share of overall GDP contracted, and mining, 
whose contribution to GDP rose spectacularly. Similar dramatic changes were not found in any other 
sector, although trade recorded a modest growth in its share of GDP. Manufacturing and general 
government even declined somewhat.
Mining’s contribution to capital formation is not, on the other hand, particularly significant apart from 
a few years in the early 1980’s. Quite common for this kind of raw material based economy is the 
important role of the government sector for maintaining the investment level. The 1970’s and 80’s was 
a period when Botswana’s dependence on mining deepened considerably. This pattern is clearly visible
3when it comes to external trade. Diamonds clearly dominate with 60 per cent of total export value in 
1980, rising to 74 per cent in 1988 while copper-nickel matte accounted for 22 per cent in 1980, but fell 
to 14 per cent in 1988, even with the exceptionally high nickel prices that year.
The mining industry in Botswana is dominated by three giant foreign companies: Amax Inc of the USA 
(30%), Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Ltd (30%), and De Beers Consolidated Mines 
Limited (DeBs). De Beers and AAC are virtually the same company with each owning a controlling 
share in the other. These international corporations, primarily South African based, control the 
production of Botswana’s three key minerals, diamonds, copper-nickel matte and coal.
Economic Geology
Superficial deposits of Kalahari sands, of Tertiary to Recent age, thinly mantle about 80% of the surface 
of Botswana, concealing much of the solid geology. Two principal tectonic domains predominate, 
firstly: the ancient cratonic regions which have been stable for billions of years and, secondly, the mobile 
belts which have suffered various phases of deformation/ metamorphism. Baldock13 proposes a third, 
arbitrary, division of “platform areas”, consisting of undeformed supracrustal rocks of various ages 
overlying the cratons and mobile belts.
The cratonic regions or stabilised blocks occur in the east (Zimbabwean craton) and the south-east 
(Kaapvaal craton) with the Limpopo mobile belt in between them and consist of granitic and gneissic 
rocks surrounding Archaean schistbelts (greenstone or gold belts) which comprise a volcano-sedimen­
tary sequence containing economicdeposits of gold, copper-nickel, copper, iron and minor base metals. 
The Zimbabwean craton also hosts the Bushman Mine Series (Matsitama) of Proterozoic calcareous 
sediments containing stratiform copper deposits genetically similar to those of the Lomagundi in 
Zimbabwe.
The Limpopo mobile belt in the extreme east contains reworked pieces of Archaean schistbelts with 
nickel-copper-cobalt mineralization, the most important of which are the Selebi-Phikwe deposits, and 
minor iron occurrences. The later, Damaran belt in the north-west is extensively covered by Kalahari 
sands and therefore is not well exposed. However it is known to contain important stratiform copper 
mineralisation in argillites of the Ghanzi Group probably formed in a similar environment to those of 
the Zambian Copperbelt14.
The oldest platform cover rocks are those of the Ventersdorp and Transvaal Supergroups which extend 
over the border from South Africa, on the Kaapvaal craton, in the southeast of Botswana and contain 
manganese/iron deposits at Kgwakgwe and Lobatse and an igneous complex, similar to that of the 
platinum and chromite Bushveld Igneous Complex (BIC), has been located in the south at Molopo 
Farms. The rocks of the Proterozoic also contain minor deposits of base metals and lead-zinc in the 
extreme south-east of the country.
The sediments of the Waterberg Supergroup unconformably overly the Transvaal Supergroup, and the 
Limpopo mobile belt, is intruded by numerous syenitic and doleritic dykes and sills, and contains iron 
(manganese) deposits. The associated Shoshong Group contains deposits of manganese and iron in 
arkose and limestone formations.
Sediments of the Karoo Supergroup form a basin running across the country from the south-west to the 
north-east and contain enormous reserves of coal in the Middle Ecca sediments of the Morupule and 
Mmamabula areas. The Kalahari Formation consists of continental clastic sediments overlain by,
partially consolidated, aeolian (windblown) sands. The Recent pan and deltaic sediments currently 
under formation contain important deposits of soda brines in the Makgadikgadi pan.
Finally, the economically most important rocks are the numerous kimberlite pipes in trading the Karoo 
in the Orapa area and the Kaapvaal craton in the Jwaneng area. These pipes host the diamonds that 
constitute the bulk of the value of the nation’s mineral production and are the source of Botswana’s 
spectacular growth over the last two decades.
Mining Policy
The sixth National Development Plan, 1985-91, states that:
“Development of mineral resources is not an economic objective in itself, rather it 
is a means to an end. The ultimate objective of mineral development is to realise 
the maximum national economic benefit from available resources in terms of local 
value added by the minerals sector”10
More specifically, the Plan outlines six general contributions that the minerals sector is expected to 
make towards national development objectives:
1) Generate productive economic activity.
2) Provide economic activity in the rural areas.
3) Generate government revenues for rural development.
4) Provide employment
5) Generate indirect economic activity by mining inputs supply
6) Training of locals to replace expatriates1 1.
These objectives are particularly bland and all except the last would occur automatically with the 
expansion of mineral production. Significantly, no mention is made of any objectives on the downstream 
processing of minerals for the establishment of local industry based on mineral resources and no 
mention is made of the crucial area of ownership of the minerals sector. If all of the stated objectives 
are achieved, Botswana will have made no progress in changing the structure of the minerals industry 
from that of an enclave, oil-type sector, vertically linked to the developed countries, to that of the 
primary sector for local resource-based industrialisation.
The National Development Plan goes on to define five specific policy objectives for the minerals sector:
1) maximise mineral exploration and exploitation,
2) maximise national benefits from mining,
3) maximise local value-added,
4) maximise employment of nationals,
5) minimise environmental damage12.
Here again, except for the third, the objectives are bland and make noattempt to restructure the present 
role of the mining industry. In terms of the two decades preceding this Plan, these policies are essentially 
“more of the same”.
The mining industry is governed by the Mines and Minerals Act of 1976. According to Johnson there 
are five different aspects to be considered in the Botswana mining policy.15
1) Mineral rights vested in the government: All mineral reconnaissance, prospecting and mining
operations are controlled by the Mines and Minerals Act, which stipulates that all rights of ownership 
of minerals are vested in the State. In 1967, mineral rights on tribal lands were transferred to the
government, with the exception of common building materials. However, in the Tribal Territories this 
stipulation may be modified by the provisions of the Mineral Rights in Tribal Territories Act. Large 
areas with important minerals potential were held in private hands. The transfer of these rights to the 
government was expedited after the enactment in 1972 of a substantial tax on privately held mineral 
rights.
2) The role of the private sector: The private sector is assigned a major role in the exploration and 
development of the country’s mineral resources. To date, the government has been far more successful 
in making large multinationals follow its guidelines and policies than small local companies, as almost 
all investment in exploration is by the TNCs. Government involvement and monitoring of private sector 
activities includes: equity and board participation; regulation through its Mines and Geological Survey 
Departments; and the use of specialised consultants.
3) Mineral exploration: A clear concessional system, combined with a policy of releasing geological 
information to potential investors, are the major tools for encouraging prospecting. In Botswana there 
are three types of concessions, a reconnaissance permit, a prospecting licence and a mining lease.
A reconnaissance permit can be issued to any individual or company. Such a permit can last for a 
maximum period of one year and it is offered free of charge. The only obligation to the government is 
that a report on the activities should be filed within three months after the expiry period. Possession of 
a permit does not, however, guarantee a prospecting licence.
A prospecting licence covers an area of 1,000 km2 or less and can initially be issued for a period of three 
years and thereafter it can be renewed twice for two years. An application must contain a satisfactory 
work programme, including a financial commitment. Holding of a licence does not automatically give 
a right to obtain a mining lease, but a prospecting licence is a pre-requisite for obtaining a mining lease.
Application for a Mining Lease is made to the Minister of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs, 
through the Mining Commissioner. A Mining Lease is subject to specific terms that are the outcome of 
negotiations between the parties. Its maximum validity is for 25 years, but may be extended for up to 
another 25 years.
4) Negotiation and administration of mineral agreements: Generally speaking, government has indi­
cated that private investors should be able to earn a “reasonable” return on their investment. However, 
what shall be regarded as a “reasonable” return has never been quantified. The government feels that 
this must be determined on a project-by-project basis.
Royalty is calculated on sales revenue (gross marketable value of the mineral or mineral products less 
any costs incurred for the transport of output prior to disposal, for insurance and other costs). Rates for 
different minerals usually vary between 3 and 10 per cent. Free government equity is normally 
demanded, varying from 15 per cent up to 25 per cent. Government may increase its equity, by purchase, 
up to 50%. Normal company income tax is applicable and the currentrates is about 40 per cent. A 
withholding tax of 15 per cent of repatriated profits can also be levied.
Following negotiations between the parties, a tailor-made package is agreed upon. According to 
Johnson, the government enters such negotiations well-prepared and with a clear conception of the 
viability of each project
“Government analysis includes an estimation of the internal rate of return to the 
investor in both current and constant terms and also estimates the government’s 
net present value of revenues for different fiscal regimes. Because of differences in 
the discount rate between government and the investor, it has been possible to vary 
depreciation and government paid equity to a project in order to increase both the 
government’s net present value and the company’s internal rate of return to 
produce agreements that might not otherwise have been achieved.”16
5) Government control of infrastructure: The most sensitive issue concerns the additional costs 
involved forbuilding up supporting infrastructural facilities. Companies have been reluctant to pick up 
non-mine related infrastructure costs, even when the overall impact on the internal rate of return on 
their investment has been minimal. In this regard the rail link for the new Sua Pan project will be 
financed by the state.
. Mineral Production 
G eneral
Traditional mining of gold and copper has been carried out in Botswana from five to seven hundred years 
ago when the schistbelts (goldbelts) in the north-east of the country, around Francistown, were part of 
the gold mining areas of the Munhumutapa Empire of Zimbabwe. It is estimated that the these miners 
extracted six tonnes of gold from the Tati reefs alone before the decline of the Empire17. The Monarch 
reefs near Francistown were the site of the first European mine in southern Africa which started 
production as early as 1869 and by the late 19th Century there were numerous small gold operations in 
the Tati area.
Table 4. BOTSWANA, MINERAL PRODUCTION.
1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Avg 80-89
VALUE §MP:, 4 53 304 1031 1245 1359 2155 3050
Coal k t 0 71 371 437 500 579 613 663 4 2 4 1 79%
C ob alt k t .0 0 0 .092 .226 .2 2 2 .1 6 2 .1 8 2 .2 9 8 .2 1 5 .2 2 0 2 -5%
Copper k t .0 6 . 5 1 5 .6 2 1 .7 2 1 .3 1 8 .9 2 4 . 4 2 3 .4 1 7 . 62 50%
Diamonds Mots .6 2 .4 i i i i i 1 2 .6 1 3 .1 1 3 .2 1 5 .2 1 5 .3 7 . 4 3 200%
Gem S to n e s t 13 45 20 14 5 40 38 146 4 0 3 630%
Gold t .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 1 3 .0 2 5 .0 3 2 .0 2 1 .0 6 7 .0 2 4 4
Lime k t .00 ,0 0 .00 2 .6 0 .23 .3 4 ..23 .0 0 ,4 6 s
Manganese k t 4 8 .3 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
N ic k e l k t .0 6 .4 1 5 .4 1 9 .6 1 9 .0 1 6 .5 2 2 . 5 2 3 .3 1 6 . 7 2 51%
T alc | k t l .04 .1 4 .0 8 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 0
__ ________________ .. _ ___ _____. — .. - - ' — _ __ __ __________;
11976-88,21974-88,31970-88,41981-88, '51982-88
Sources: Department of Mines, 1985/9.
V________________________________________________ J
In terms of value, mineral production has increased from four million Pula in 1970 to over two billion 
Pula in 1988. In 1970 mineral production was restricted to diamonds (583 kcarats), manganese (48.3 kt), 
talc (361), semi-precious stones (131) and building aggregate. Diamond mining took off in 1972, coal 
in 1973 and copper-nickel-cobalt in 1975, while manganese production ceased in 1973.
D iam onds
The history of diamond mining in Botswana starts when the first significant diamond discovery was 
made by De Beers Prospecting (Pty) Ltd in 1967, near a cattle post called Orapa. De Beers Botswana 
Mining Company (Propriety) Limited (Debswana) was formed in 1969 to develop these deposits. The 
mine was initially designed to produce 2.5 million carats a year and went into production in 1971.
Continued exploration revealed two further payable, but smaller pipes, at Letlhakane in the vicinity of 
Orapa. The partners in the company entered into negotiations for the exploitation of these pipes and 
also for an expansion of the Orapa plant. In 1973 De Beers geologists discovered the Jwaneng pipe.
The government increased its shareholding in Debswana from 15 to 50 per cent in 1975, when 
preparations for expanding Orapa and opening up production at Letlhakane started. In 1976 negotia­
tions were opened up between De Beers and the Botswana government on Jwaneng. The negotiations 
were protracted and reflected the government’s belief that the original mining agreement should be 
altered as Orapa had proved more profitable than originally foreseen. Details of the new agreement 
have not been disclosed, but the net effect is estimated to have raised the government’s take of profits, 
through income tax, royalties and dividends, from 50 to 70 per cent
The only mining company producing diamonds in Botswana is Debswana which is managed by Anglo 
American Services Limited. In 1989 the three operations, Orapa, Lethlakane and Jwaneng, produced 
15.252 million carats of diamonds from 16.16 million tonnes of ore (0.94 carats/tonne). The three mines 
have been a key factor in the recent economic growth of Botswana and the future prospects of the 
country will continue to be intimately tied to their production. Reserves at all three operations are 
expected to last well beyond their 25 year leases18 and at Jwaneng, which is the richest kimberlite pipe 
in the world, opencast operations will continue for 40 years before production starts underground19.
Table 5. BOTSWANA, DIAMOND PRODUCTION
1989
Mine
Ore
(Mt)
Diamonds 
(M ca ra ts )
Grade 
( c t s / t )
Orapa 7 .3 3 8 6 .0 6 3  40% 0 .8 3
L et lh a k a n e 2 .9 9 6 0 .7 7 4  5% 0 .2 6
Jwaneng 5 .8 2 8 8 .4 1 5  55% 1 .4 4
T o ta ls 1 6 .1 6 2 1 5 .2 5 2  100% 0 .9 4
Source: Dept of Mines 1990, page 13.
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Due to Jwaneng, not only does Botswana’s overall output exceed that of South Africa in volume, but it 
also contains a higher proportion of gem diamonds. Only 20 per cent of Jwaneng’s output is estimated 
to be industrial compared to 50 per cent of Orapa’s output. In 1988 Debswana’s output exceeded the 
combined production from all De Beers’ mines (South Africa and, Namibia). Consequently, Debswana 
plays a significant role for De Beers’ group mines, as it contributes over 60 per cent of total group 
output20.
In 1989 De Beers stated that of their retained profits of 2.3 billion Rand (over one billion USD) for 1988, 
only 23% came from their South African and Namibian operations, while 77% came from “else­
where”21. Part of this 1.77 billion Rand (780 million USD) would have came from their operations in 
Botswana.
^  Table 6. DEBSWANA, FINANCIAL PROFILE (MPuIa)
1982 1983 1984 1985 198$ 1987 1988
C a p i t a l  Employed 436 458 478 509 572 990 1104
F ix e d  A s s e t s 425 444 459 481 517 571 669
Debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tax na 118 171 322 370 673 582
P r o f i t s 82 177 257 483 555 1009 873
P r o f i t / c a p i t a l 19% 39% 54% 95% 97% 102% 79%
Source: Debswana 1984-89
V________________________________________ J
The Debswana operations have proved to be extremely profitable and in 1987 the return on capital 
employed was over 100% and the average return for the period 1982 to 1988 was 69%.
The marketing of diamonds internationally has, as is well known, been the prerogative of De Beers 
Central Selling Organisation (CSO). During the latter part of 1980, CSO stockpiled some of its 
diamonds in order to counteract price falls. Prices have since then gradually improved with “the 
exceptionally high rate of growth in world retail sales of diamond jewellery (which has) provided the 
impetus for increased CSO sales and continued expansion of the diamond industry worldwide”22.
The government of Botswana became a minor shareholder in De Beers in 1987 when, in July that year, 
De Beers purchased Debswana’s entire diamond stockpile, accumulated during the 1982-85 period of 
weak demand. Debswana was paid a cash sum of undisclosed amount together with 20 million shares 
in De Beers, corresponding to a 5.27 per cent interest in the total capital of De Beers. The government 
of Botswana consequently now holds a 2.63 per cent effective interest in De Beers, valued at 380 million 
USD at the time of the transaction23.
The deal has a commercial motivation, but can also be seen in the context of increasing political pressure 
on South Africa. De Beers is anxious to keep its monopoly position in diamond marketing, and the 
Debswana deal makes the links closer between Botswana and De Beers, reducing the risk to De Beers 
that Debswana might seek to market its output independently. In addition, one of the Front Line States 
(FLS) now has a vested interest in the maintenance of a capitalist system in a post-Apartheid South 
Africa, as it is unlikely that they would not oppose the nationalisation of their shareholding. Although 
in 1990 this holding moved to De Beers Centenary in Switzerland, this new company still owns the South 
African and Botswanan operations.
Since 1974 preliminary sorting of diamonds has been carried out in Gaborone by the Botswana 
Diamond Valuing Company, a Debswana subsidiary, before the stones are channelled via the CSO to 
the international market. The stones are flown via Kimberley to London for marketing by the Diamond 
Trading Company (DTC). The government has also taken steps to establish direct marketing of 
polished stones, on a small scale, to diamond trading centres; Mabrodium NV, a Belgian diamond 
cutting firm, was given permission by the government to establish a.diamond cutting operation in 
Gaborone in 1979. In November 1982, Orapa House, Botswana’s new diamond sorting headquarters 
was opened in Gaborone and has recently been expanded to handle 17 Mcarats/annum. In practice, 
however, the marketing monopoly held by the CSO is really not threatened.
Copper-Nickel-Cobait
Copper/nickel deposits were discovered in 1966 at Selebi and Phikwe by Bamangwato Concessions Ltd 
(BCL). This company is a subsidiary of Botswana RSTLtd (incorporated in 1967) which controls 85 per 
cent of the shares, with the Botswana government having a 15 per cent interest. Botswana RST Ltd, in 
turn, is jointly owned by Amax Nickel Inc, based in the US, Anglo American Corporation and different 
private concerns.
Production from Phikwe started in February 1974, using both underground and open pit methods. A 
concentrator/smelting operation was also established at Phikwe. However, the mine soon ran into 
operating problems, particularly with the Finnish (Outukumpu Oy) flash furnace which was the largest 
in the world at that time. Due to these problems, the initially designed production capacity of 45 kt 
annually was not reached until 1977 and, as a consequence, BCL was unable to repay its massive debt 
and interest.
The poor financial situation was further aggravated by a decline in the price of nickel and copper during 
the late 1970’s and most of the 1980’s. In 1979 a complex restructuring of the debt took place, and again 
in 1982, so that only 30 per cent of the debt remained payable as senior debt. This was deferred until 1985 
and then rescheduled over a 10 year period from 1986 to 1995.
In 1982 the combined effect of low metal prices, high interest rates and foreign currency losses (most 
of the debt is foreign) due to the Pula’s depreciation had created a situation where the mine actually 
should have been shut down, on commercial grounds alone. However, with 5,000 workers, the mine is 
one of the country’s largest employers and a continuation of operations was regarded as necessary and 
the rescheduling of the debt was effected. The partners were responsible for their share of the debt and 
thus preferred to reschedule than to payout the debtors, as the mine has consistently made an operating 
profit (before interest payments).
As part of the 1985 restructuring, Anglo American Corporation, AMAX and the government agreed 
to extend the existing emergency funding facility in the ratio 37.5-37.5-25. Finally, the mining lease was 
amended to increase the royalty due to the government from 3 per cent to 3.41 per cent of the gross metal 
value in the matte as from 1986.
^  Table 7. BOTSWANA RST, FINANCIAL PROFILE ^
(MPula) 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Capital E m p l o y e d 304 295 296 384 184 159 323 365
F ixed Assets 324 335 385 462 280 281 288 319
Turnover 64 68 78 120 99 129 421 432
Debt 540 637 865 1323 1326 1281 1629 1583
Tax/Royalties 0 4 5 7 6 7 16 20
Profits -129  --106 --227 -323 -8 25 -1 8 2 93
Debt/Capital 178% 216% 292% 344% 721% 806% 505% 434%
Source: Botswana RST J 983-90.
V _ _______________________ :__________________________________________ )
By 1989 the company had a crippling debt of 1.58 billion Pula, four times the capital employed 
(365 MPula). In that year, however, it made a profit of 93 MPula due to exceptionally high nickel prices, 
but the accumulated deficit still stood at 1.25 billion Pula24.
During 1987 there was a major overhaul of the flash furnace which allowed for exceptional output in 
1988 of 57.5 kt of matte containing 22.5 kt of nickel, 24.4 kt of copper and 298 tonnes of cobalt. In 1989 
the company received a SYSMIN loan of 21.7 MECU from the EEC for exploration and partial re­
equipping.
In 1985 Amax agreed to an early termination of its refining contract, if it received compensation 
(30 MUSD) for loss of matte feed to its Port Nickel refinery in Louisiana. The main new contract is with 
Falconbridge International of Bermuda, a subsidiary of Canada’s Falconbridge now owned by Noranda 
(USA). BCL will supply Falconbridge’s Kristiansand refinery in Norway with 42 kt of matte annually 
from 1987 until the 14-year agreement expires in 1999.
A second contract is with Centametall of Zug, Switzerland, an international metals trading subsidiary 
of RTZ Corporation25, for the supply 10.5 kt/an of low sulphur matte from 1986, for a 10 year period. 
Supplies to Centametall are to be toll-refined by Empress Nickel Mining Company (ENMC), a wholly- 
owned subsidiary of Rio Tinto Zimbabwe (RTZim), at its Eiffel Flats refinery (RTZim is controlled by 
RTZ PLC of the UK which has a 56 per cent stake), which had been placed on a care-and-maintenance 
basis, following the closure of the Empress Nickel Mine during 1982. A  small amount of matte (about 
3 kt/an) is also supplied to the Anglo American’s Bindura Nickel Refinery in Zimbabwe, but this deal 
will expire in 1990.
Given the corporate linkages between RTZ and Centametall this contract is open to transfering RTZim 
profits out of Zimbabwe. Conclusive evidence is, not surprisingly, not at hand. But if RTZim is toll- 
refining at less than the normal, say Kristiansand’s, price then a lower profit is madeby RTZim and the 
difference is effectively located in Switzerland (with lower tax and no repatriation limits) instead of 
Zimbabwe.
In 1988 Tati Nickel Mining Company (Pty) Ltd was granted a mining lease over the Selkirk and Phoenix 
deposits, east of Francistown in theTati Archaean schistbelt, and production started in 1989 at an initial 
rate of 60 kt/annum of ore which is toll-smelted by BCL26 and then toll-refined at the Empress refinery 
in Zimbabwe (2.4 kt of matte per annum). This is a joint venture between Centametall (see above), 
which holds 51% of the equity, and a group of UK investors. The operation is managed by BCL and 
reserves at Selkirk are reported to be 1.2 Mt at 2.4% Ni27 and 1.3% Cu28. Although the current 
production rate only constitutes 2% of BCL’s feed, the development of the large Phoenix deposits 
(2.9 Mt at 2% Ni and 0.8% Cu) could represent a major new source of ore29 which will be developed by 
BCL under contract to Centametall. The Phoenix ore will also be toll-smelted by BCL and toll-refined 
by Empress (about 6.5 kt of matte/annum from 1993) which will bring the latter up to full capacity.
The reason why this deposit was not developed by BCL is most probably that, given its huge debt, it could 
not raise the necessary extra capital, which a new company could. The ramifications of having a 
purchaser of BCL matte, Centametall, also a supplier of BCL feed, are still unclear.
C oal
Exploration was carried out in the Morupule and Mmamabule areas by the Geological Survey of 
Botswana between 1952 and 1962 and detailed proving of the Morupule coalfield in 1972. The 
Morupule Colliery, 93 per cent owned by the Anglo American Corporation, was developed in 1973 to 
supply the Selebi-Phikwe mine for its smelter and for power generation, by the Botswana Power 
Corporation (BPC), and accounts for 100 per cent of Botswana’s coal production30.
The coal is classified as steam coal (ash 18-24%, CV 23-25 MJ/kg)31, in situ reserves amount to 8 Gt32 
and output has been expanded to 650 kt/an, half of which goes to meet the requirements of the 123 MW 
Morupule thermal power station (BPC). The colliery presently supplies the Gaborone and Selebi- 
Phikwe thermal power stations and the Orapa/Letlhakane diamond mines and provision is being made 
to supply the Sua Pan soda ash project (see below). Plans to expand production to 1 Gt/an by 1992 are 
being implemented33
The main constraint for developing the huge coal mining potential of Botswana for sale on the world 
market is the distance to coal-handling ports. The construction of a new large coal mine is dependent 
on the building of a railway line from eastern Botswana across the Kalahari desert and Namibia to 
Walvis Bay, which was considered in the early 1980’s by Shell Coal Botswana (the Kgaswe Project) but 
found not to be viable. It was estimated that the Trans-Kalahari railway would cost over one billion USD 
then (1984) and that an international coal price of at least 60 USD/t (in 1984) would be necessary for 
theproject tobe viable34, but given the independenceof Namibia, though not yet Walvis Bay, the project 
is likely to be resuscitated.
Soda A sh
Sua Pan is the most easterly part of the Makgadikgadi depression which contains a brine saturated 
aquifer rich in soda ash (sodium carbonate) and common salt (sodium chloride) estimated at 2.4 billion 
cubic metres of brine35 over a 200 km2 area. This resource was investigated by RST Exploration Limited 
in the 1960’s, but nothing came of the feasibility study carried out by Arthur D. Little Inc of the USA.
Soda Ash Botswana (Pty) Ltd was formed by BP Minerals, who bought RST in the late 1970’s but “...the 
project was put on ice in 1984 when South Africa refused to ratify a marketing agreement unless 
Botswana signed a non-aggression pact...”36 similar to the, now infamous, Nkomati Accord of 1984 
between the RSA and Mozambique. After BP Minerals pulled out Soda Ash Botswana was taken over 
by African Explosives and Chemical Industries (AECI, an AAC company) of South Africa, with AAC 
and De Beers (52%) and the Botswana Government (48%), and South Africa’s plans for a synthetic 
plant were shelved.
The project will cost just under one billion Rand and will start production in 1991. It will produce 300 kt/ 
annum of soda ash and 650 kt/annum of salt, principally for the South African market, generate export 
earnings of about 100 MPula/annum and employ about 500 people37. The Government’s share of the 
cost is reported to be 270 MPula for the 48% equity and 125 MPula for infrastructure, mainly for the 
165 km Sua Pan - Francistown rail link38.
Although some of the product will be purchased by SADCC countries (mainly Zimbabwe and Zambia) 
in the spirit of SADCC’s policy of collective self-reliance, the project goes counter to one of SADCC’s 
principal objectives, that of decreasing dependence on the RSA. Not only will most of the output be 
dependent on the South African market, but the plant will be owned and run by South African 
companies. “However, with an estimated 85% of its export revenue already coming from the De Beers 
controlled diamond operations, Botswana has become used to a life of compromise”39.
O ther M inerals
Small amounts of gold are produced at rate of 10-30 kg per annum from old tailings dumps (Golden 
Sands and Shamrock) and small-scale underground operations (Mineral Holdings and Morex) mainly 
in the Tati schistbelt. In 1989 production started from the Map Nora underground gold mine owned by 
the Shashe Mining Company, which is a joint venture between Falconbridge (Canada) and Phelps
Dodge (USA), and from the new Metore (Pty) Limited operation.
Other mining operations include clay for bricks and tiles (Makoro, Clayton, Kwena and Foley), lime 
(226 tonnes in 1988), crushed stone (338 cubic metres in 1988) and semi-precious stones (38.6 tonnes 
in 1988). Manganese ore was produced from 1957 until 1973 from the Kgwakgwe, Lobatse South and 
Otse deposits, but most of the high grade economic ore has been removed. Exploration in the 
sedimentary basins of western Botswana has thus far come up with nothing, though work is continuing.
A SADCC/UNRFNRE report of 1988 proposed the further exploration of the Matsiloje limestone 
deposit, in the north-east near Francistown, as the possible base for a local cement industry, which has 
been taken up by the Botswana government40. The Geological Survey has already conducted a survey 
of the deposit.
In 1989 a US firm, Interkiln of Houston, signed a joint venture agreement with the Botswana 
Development Corporation (BDC) for the construction of a brick and tile factory based on the Woodhall 
clay deposits near Lobatse at a cost of 18 MPula, mainly for the local market, but also for export to South 
Africa41. Given Botswana’s membership of the SACU, it would appear to be inevitable that a feasibility 
study of any industrial mineral development will include an assessment of the South African market, 
thereby increasing Botswana’s dependence on that economy.
Alayered intrusive thought to be an outlier of the Bushveld Igneous Complex (BIC) in South Africa has 
been located under the Kalahari sands in southern Botswana near Werda. The prospect (Molopo 
Farms) is being investigated by Molopo Australia Ltd and Inco (Canada) for platinum group metals. 
Molopo are also assessing several kimberlite pipes near Jwaneng.
Infrastructure
The infrastructure in the narrow eastern strip, between the desert and the South African and Zimbab­
wean borders, has improved remarkably in the last two decades, as has road access to the two diamond 
mining areas (Orapa and Jwaneng), but the vast western hinterland remains practically inaccessible.
Good condition tar roads now run from the Kazungula ferry on the Zambezi River, in the north, down 
to the Mafekeng road border in the south. There international surfaced road connections are to South 
Africa and Zimbabwe (Plumtree), but no good road connection exists yet with Namibia, though an 
upgrade of the Caprivi Strip route is under consideration, particularly for future trade between Namibia 
and Zimbabwe.
The railway put in by Rhodes in the 1890’s, from Mafekeng (RSA) to Plumtree (Zimbabwe) is still all 
that exists except for minor spurs to Morupule and Selebi-Phikwe. The planned Sua Pan link will be the 
first major rail extension for a century. The Trans-Kalahari rail link to Gobabis in Namibia is still under 
consideration.
Thepower grid covers all of the eastern strip and is linked into both the Zimbabwean and South African 
grids. The Zimbabwe link was as a result of a Canadian-funded (CIDA) SADCC initiative. In 1987/8 
Morupule power station supplied 59% of demand, Selebi-Phikwe 32%, Gaborone 0.6% and imports 
from South Africa 8.5%42.
The construction of the Seretse Khama international airport and the establishment of an earth satellite 
station have made Botswana independent of South Africa for air links and telecommunications with the
rest of the world.
Discussion
In conclusion the present rather favourable economic situation of Botswana is the result of a 
development process which started in the mid-1970’s. This process exhibits some very distinct features:
* A rapid and unbalanced growth in the GDP
* A rapid growth in the contribution of mining to total GDP
* A considerable reduction in the relative and absolute 
contribution of agriculture to GDP
* A quickly growing external trade, fuelled by mining 
activities
* A strong growth in government revenues, primarily caused 
by mining revenues and the SACU
Although the economy experienced a temporary slump in 1980-82, growth resumed from 1982 onwards 
largely as a result of the start of production from the new Jwaneng diamond mine and the depreciation 
of the Pula. Botswana is heavily dependent upon diamond production and international diamond prices 
(half of government revenue and three-quarters of exports are from diamond mining). Few if any of the 
other economic sectors can be expected to contribute anything of significance to the general growth of 
the economy in the near future.
The structure of the international diamond market is, however, simple in the sense that it is more or less 
completely controlled by the De Beers dominated Central Selling Organisation (CSO), which is in a 
position to determine prices. This leaves a country like Botswana in a situation where it will have very 
little control over the crucial marketing aspects of diamond production a control which would be 
desirable as market considerations can easily make or break the Botswana economy.
Thus, with an economic structure heavily dependent on the extraction of minerals and with very little 
room for manoeuvre on the international market for these minerals, the Botswana government is left 
with few options for independent development. The extent to which the exploitation of her natural 
resources is controlled by the country herself is of course another crucial matter.
The lopsided growth process, generated by the mining industry in general and the diamond mines in 
particular, has created a very unbalanced economic structure. The mining industry has had very few 
positive influences on the development of other economic sectors, except perhaps the public sector and 
the provision of infrastructure. Unemployment has been rising faster than new jobs even though real 
GDP growth has outpaced population growth; this is in part due to the capital intensive nature of 
mineral driven growth over the last two decades. Due to Botswana’s small market, it has been difficult 
to identify industries that would be viable after the eight year SACU infant industry protection period. 
In this regard Botswana could possibly gain from an integrated regional industrial strategy43 that would 
locate certain facilities in Botswana to supply the regional market, but the regional industries would 
then want preferential access to the Botswana market for their products which would be difficult under 
the SACU.
The lot of the rural poor has not improved economically, though it has in terms of social services, due 
to the fact that the national cattle herd is at its maximum size44 and because other forms of small scale 
agricultural growth are severely restricted by the low and unreliable rainfall. Ultimately, any plans for 
agricultural development come up against the hard fact that Batswana people are precariously perched 
on the edge of a semi-desert and it could well be more rational for Botswana to use its vast reserves of
forex in joint ventures with its neighbours such as Zambia and Zimbabwe, who have many viable 
development projects that lack foreign currency.
The rapid development of the mining industry has deepened Botswana’s dependence on the Republic 
of South Africa and South African mining capital, particularly the AAC- a dependence which even 
before was substantial through the membership in the South African Customs Union and the presence 
of Botswana migrant labour in the mines of South Africa. Today, South Africa mining capital controls 
the production and marketing of diamonds and it exercises a considerable influence on Botswana’s 
copper-nickel and coal production as well. If the mining sector is further developed it is quite likely that 
not only will South African based mining companies increase their presence in the country, but that use 
of South African infrastructural facilities will increase as well.
Politically Botswana played an important role in the founding of the SADCC but due to its location, size 
(population) and historical links to South Africa (SACU and AAC), it has not benefited much from 
SADCC projects, mainly in infrastructure, and will find it difficult to participate in a regional industrial 
strategy while still a member of the SACU. The fact that it is the only SADCC member not to join the 
PTA, indicates its difficulties in participating in an alternative trade arrangement.
Thus, one may safely conclude that Botswana’s continued economic progress is completely linked to 
an extensive development of its mineral resources. This in turn will deepen its presentstructural feature 
of a mineral economy with its built-in unbalanced character. Furthermore, continued reliance on 
mineral exploitation will increase its dependence on South Africa in general and South African mining 
capital in particular. This process will place important question marks with respect to the role of 
Botswana in the movement for the political and economic liberation of Southern Africa from the 
devastating influence of the apartheid regime in Pretoria. In fact time has proved the 1981 assessment 
of the South African government’s Minerals Bureau to be substantialy correct, that...
“Despite her oft-repeated opposition to South Africa’s domestic policies, Botswana 
is for the present irrevocably tied to the RSA and it is to be expected that this co­
operation between the two countries will likely increase”45
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